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ggerian existential hermeneutics, especially Mitsein/Mitdasein. Dasein’s existence-essence is based on 
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own possibilities—to wit—be oneself (Jemeines).
Keywords: Being qua Being, existence, being-in-the-world, authenticity versus inauthenticity, deper-
sonalisation, hermeneutics, existentialism.
© ANNA MAŁECKA, PIOTR MRÓZ, 2021
46 ANNA MAŁECKA, PIOTR MRÓZ
ХАЙДЕГГЕРОВСКОЕ ПОНЯТИЕ DASEIN  







Доктор философских наук, профессор.
Департамент философии культуры, Ягеллонский Университет.
33-332 Краков, Польша.
E-mail: piotr.mroz@uj.edu.pl
В статье представлена нестандартная интерпретация знаменитого хайдеггеровского экзистен-
циала das Man в  аспекте его часто недооцениваемого единства с  Dasein  — сущего, имеюще-
го особый онтико-онтологический приоритет. Авторы стремятся осветить эту важную тему 
с  точки зрения своеобразного единства принадлежащего Dasein бытия-в-мире (in-der-Welt-
Sein), охватывающего многие последующие и непосредственно соседствующие с ним экзистен-
циалы в аналитике хайдеггеровской экзистенциальной герменевтики, особенно Mitsein/Mitda-
sein. Существование-сущность Dasein основана на структуре возможностей, и, следовательно, 
свободном, спонтанном выборе, в то время как das Man представляет собой конкретный модус 
существования, делающий, если можно так выразиться, все другие модусы недействительны-
ми и непригодными. Хотя Хайдеггер далек от какой-либо этической или моральной позиции 
в традиционном смысле, он весьма решительно настаивает на том, что феномен das Man ниве-
лирует подлинно человеческий набросок собственных возможностей, а именно возможности 
быть собой (Jemeines). Представленный в статье концепт Dasein является уникальным приме-
ром хайдеггеровской интерпретации гуссерлевской феноменологии, нацеленной на проясне-
ние несобственного существования. Хотя Хайдеггер посвящает этой проблеме лишь пару стра-
ниц, аналитика Dasein вызвала огромное количество философских и культурных откликов.
Ключевые слова: Бытие qua Бытие, экзистенция, бытие-в-мире, собственность против несоб-
ственности, деперсонализация, герменевтика, экзистенциализм.
The present paper’s focus is on the Heideggerian existential period before the so 
called Khere, the seminal transformation of the fundamental ontology presented by 
the philosopher some years after his masterpiece Sein and Zeit (published in 1927). 
As is hardly disputed, the initial project of this “unfaithful” and iconoclastic disci-
ple of Edmund Husserl was not only aimed at overcoming, indeed getting rid of, all 
the remnants of traditional, by then useless according to Heidegger’s metaphysics of 
presence (Mróz, 1997, 14), dogmatic tenets and allegedly clear and “obvious,” “self-ev-
ident,” “complacent” concepts (the destruction project), but was first and foremost 
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aimed at restoring the most critical and essential problem of Being qua Being (das 
Sein) as univocally distinguished from beings (Seienden) (Pöggeler, 1963). According 
to Heidegger (time and again he refers to the issue in subsequent texts published af-
ter the appearance of Sein und Zeit), Being (das Sein) had been condemned to total 
oblivion, while fruitful, revelatory insights into the nature of Being undertaken by the 
Presocratic philosophers were marginalized in the course of Western philosophy (lat-
er Heidegger would prefer to refer to thinking rather than philosophy (2000)). What 
is more, the essential, absolutely vital and fundamental, difference between Being 
and beings (das Sein und Seienden) had been unforgivably obliterated, which brought 
about long-lasting consequences visible in the nature of those “two parties” so violent-
ly misinterpreted (the problem of the so-called ontologische Differenz). 
In the initial stages of the planned overcoming of the traditional metaphysics 
(metaphysics of logocentrically oriented—as Derrida has it—thinking) presentifying 
beings for our rationalistic priggish convenience thus justifying our conquering of 
the transcendent reality to bend it to our will, the early Heidegger parts company 
with his former master. It goes without saying that Edmund Husserl, fed up with nar-
row-minded positivism and all forms of insidious psychologism, in his celebrated bat-
tle cry of modernity promising “the return to the things themselves” displayed noth-
ing but right intentions of liberating human thinking from debilitating antinomies, 
from the utterly misleading opposition of an ever-conflictual nature: subject versus 
object, existence versus essence, being (phenomenon) versus appearance (constitu-
tion taking place in the consciousness of a transcendent thing) (Scruton, 1984, 259).
Heidegger, however, was interested in something of a more essential, crucial na-
ture. Having accepted the Husserlian proposal of phenomenology as a strict science 
(strenge Wissenschaft)—its methods of description, eidetic analysis and to a lesser extent 
the celebrated epoche (reductions) as well as constitution related to specific functions 
of consciousness, the author of Sein und Zeit went straight to the heart of the matter. 
Disavowing the idea of neutrality, still better, the possibility Husserl pointed out to neu-
tralize or put in brackets the very existence of the phenomena investigated into (the 
move to invalidate the natural standpoint responsible for so many misconceptions), 
Heidegger raised the question of the necessary condition of appearing in their bodily 
form of the constituted phenomena at all (Spiegelberg, 1969, 285). Transforming—as 
it were—the golden rule of all of the phenomenological approach—“the intentionality” 
(all consciousness is the consciousness of something transcendent thus differing essen-
tially from it), the early Heidegger declares that the genitive “cluste” Seins des Seienden 
(like the Husserlian intentionality phrase: consciousness of…) may open up a fresh vista 
for philosophical activities. As a matter of fact, that move on the part of Heidegger is 
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an attempt to return to the first Presocratic reflections on the solely important subject 
of that which is but at the same time cannot be at one with so-called entities. Under no 
pretext can one justify the bracketing of Being, confused with that “which exists,” as an 
entity. To put it differently—if phenomenology is to play the role of the only philoso-
phy capable of “turning” us to the world, thus returning it to us as it is—this new way 
of thinking must be ontology. In other terms, the main, even better the sole, theme of 
philosophy (thinking) must be Being qua Being (Richardson, 1963). 
What Heidegger refers to as Seinsfrage seems to claim its own rights and tends 
to occupy the central position in the Heideggerian fundamental ontology (Heideg-
ger, 1962, 21). Opposing the established tradition of Western philosophy, the author 
of Sein und Zeit not only breaks loose from epistemology, psychology, theories of 
methodology, logic, and all regional ontologies (by and large represented by scienc-
es—formal, empirical and social), but also rejects supreme categories that for several 
centuries have formed and exerted an influence on the way we used to think about 
the transcendent world—along with our position and situation in it. The seemingly 
simple question of What is Being? poses, however, great problems, and demands a 
complete change of what we may call a deeply rooted, hence “closing” thus narrowed 
paradigm so rife not only among philosophers but visible in such human endeavours 
like the humanities, poetry and art. The question concerning Being cannot be an-
swered with the self-evident: Being is… because it is the very “is” which constitutes an 
object of our enquiry. Being cannot be defined, grasped in logical/epistemological or 
anthropological categories. Neither is it the Platonian highest genus, nor the Aristo-
telian substance, Form or Spirit, God or matter. Still, Being must not be omitted and 
discarded because of the aforementioned failures and fallacies of the traditional ways 
of dealing with it (Heidegger, 1993).
In an unprecedented and resolute move, the far-cry of the Husserlian reductions 
cleansing and purging these notions and ideas which block and stand in the way of 
human attempts at approaching Being, its sense and meaning (Sinn und Bedeutung), 
Heidegger chooses a unique entity: Seiende, displaying a special privilege both ontic 
and ontological (Heidegger, 1962, 23 ff.). This entity named Dasein (in other than Sein 
und Zeit texts often spelt Da-sein) has been characterised in terms hardly reminiscent 
of any predicates we have been accustomed to throughout the long tradition of philo-
sophical anthropology. Nota bene Heidegger pays great attention to the very language 
he employs in his phenomenologically oriented hermeneutics. More often than not has 
he been severely criticised and even rebuked by philosophers, like some members of 
the Wiener Kreis for his untempered effusions: his cryptic, morbid, and highly meta-
phorical and poetic style. Most diligent, patient, and unbiased Heideggerian readers, 
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however, see convincing reasons for this kind of formulating of philosophical—within 
the framework of his fundamental ontology—ideas and insights. The Destruktion, the 
Überwindung (overcoming) of all the traditional metaphysics required—claims Hei- 
degger—a complete change of language which can turn out to be (as will soon be expli-
cated) an enslaving factor. Dasein is by no means a pure spirit, a soul, a subject, a con-
sciousness, the Husserlian Transcendental Ego, mind, or organic live matter of highly 
organised function. This practically untranslatable term (like so many key terms in his 
texts) shows Heidegger ever returning to the historical, even folklore (Volkish) of reli-
gious, ecclesiastical undertones going back to the medieval and romantic roots of the 
various registers of the German language. Dasein denotes—as has already been men-
tioned—a special type of being. Although vehemently dissociating himself from the ex-
istentialist movement (paradoxically so strongly influenced by his works), Heidegger re-
sorts to the very human existence in his definition of or rather insight into the ontic-on-
tological structure of Dasein (Heidegger, 1962, 26  ff.). Thus Dasein is a being whose 
existence is its essence; moreover a being capable of understanding (the Heideggerian 
hermeneutics at its best) its own Being, and hence Being as such, as well as the Being of 
other beings. That is—the philosopher seems to claim—the ontological (“logical” com-
ponent entailed in the term—harking intentionally back to the Logos of Ancient Greek 
philosophers) side of Dasein marking it off from all other beings in the world. Trying 
to follow faithfully but critically the Heideggerian path blazed through the thick forest 
of unresolved metaphysical problems, the present authors hope to reconstruct—to wit, 
to place—this celebrated concept of Dasein and its ontological travesty das Man against 
the backdrop of the whole coherent systematic structure of the Heideggerian ever semi-
nal and thought-provoking issue in question. Unlike the presuppositionless Husserlian 
phenomenology, the Heideggerian fundamental ontology does not discard a sort of 
pre-knowledge, still better, pre-understanding or pre-supposition concerning the most 
vital domain of his enquiry (Marias, 1966, 428). 
Each Dasein is born with a certain kind of awareness, a sort of power to pre-un-
derstand and eventually take advantage of this pre-knowledge, pre-concepts, pre-in-
tuition (the prefix vor in German is indicative of this purport in his ontology). Thus 
the moment we raise a certain issue (mostly of an ontological nature geared up with 
our situation in the world) an adequate answer must already be somehow, albeit par-
tially, known to us. Otherwise—Heidegger seems to stipulate—we would never be 
in the know about the subject we are enquiring about. Like a Gestalt psychologist, 
Heidegger conceives of the world and a man—Dasein—its capacities and specific cog-
nitive faculties, e.g. moods as a closely knit network of interdependencies, a mutual 
“exchange” in which, however, Dasein is a main point of reference being engaged in 
50 ANNA MAŁECKA, PIOTR MRÓZ
its projects and constantly taking care of its world (Umwelt) along with the various 
entities (beings) Dasein encounters and interacts with (Sorge, Besorgen).
Following Heidegger’s path in view of adequate reconstruction and eventual 
interpretation of this celebrated pair of concepts in question, that is Dasein and its 
ontological modality das Man, requires at least a limited presentation of the Hei-
deggerian key-terms he created in order to reveal the ontic-ontological structure of 
Dasein and its situation (Befindlichkeit). These are referred to as categories and ex-
istentialia. The latter have been divided into two types, and this division serves as a 
yardstick to measure the authenticity (Eingentlichkeit) of our existence, the opening 
(up) and closing (in) of existentialia. Both types are carefully distinguished from cate-
gories, which is reminiscent of the old Aristotelian, Thomist and Wolfian metaphysics 
Heidegger is bent on overcoming, and are mostly used to apply to beings (Seienden) 
other than Dasein. Most important to the Heideggerian presentation of the funda-
mental ontology is unquestionably the existential in-der-Welt-Sein, the indelible—so 
to speak—birthmark of every Dasein. It is noteworthy that the used preposition of 
location has for Heidegger a double connotation. There is an obvious difference be-
tween “in” applied to the passive state of, say, a wallet kept safely in my trouser-pocket, 
a pen in a desk drawer or a clerk in a governmental office, and “in” applied to Dasein 
engaged in a given Umweltl: working there, performing its duties, and, more impor-
tantly, making choices and realizing its projects. Moreover, this existential dynamism 
is accompanied by Dasein’s awareness of its human condition as marked off from the 
existentially different status of entities other than Dasein. Therefore, the Heideggerian 
presentation of Dasein’s existence in the world would not be clear without a reference 
the philosopher finds crucial, one to the specific and unique dimension of human 
temporality—having an undeniably consequential character for this problem of be-
ing-in-the-world (Rubiczek, 1966). In Sein und Zeit, the hermeneutical motif of time 
is imbued with an existential character. Time—announces the philosopher—being 
evidently under the influence of the concept of both Bergson and Husserl who made 
a distinction between the objective Chronos and subjective experiential Tempus, is 
of Dasein’s providence: temporality is a human modus of existing in the world, in the 
everyday hustle and bustle, as well as the “now” by the immersion in the world of “im-
mutable” laws, in the world of past “by-gone” events implying the course of human 
culture and civilization. Put differently, Dasein was born into the world found, given-
as-it-was at a certain point of time thus initiating as it were our ecstatic temporality1. 
1 For Heidegger the nature of time is never homogeneous. In other terms time is of no linear nature. 
Three ecstasies of temporality: the past ever present in the now and the future are the epitome of 
the human condition. The past, present and future co-mingle with each other thus making our 
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This unique event marks an important fact Heidegger refers to as Geworfenheit (the 
throwness into, or having-been-thrown into: the latter phrase better renders the past, 
“already” accomplished aspect of our condition. Although the philosopher is far from 
excessively highlighting the indisputable fact of a lack of reason whatsoever for our 
“finding ourselves” here and now, in this place, and not another, of having been born 
into this and not that family, speaking this not that language, belonging to this cul-
tural formation not the other, the fact of our contingency (constant and insurmount-
able factor of Geworfenheit) constitutes the nature of this important existential2. As 
will have been remembered, Dasein’s existence, at one with its essence, is our own 
unique affair. This concept of existential uniqueness is linguistically rendered by a 
special term newly-coined by the philosopher, one awkward even for the German 
ear: jemeines, Jemeinigkeit. What Heidegger intends to achieve by introducing such a 
term is of a twofold purpose. For one thing, a human being in its inalienable ipseity 
is ever related to his/her own personal being (verhält sich zu). And as we shall see 
in due course, Jemeinigkeit is not a constant ontological state—it will be facing its 
destruction due to its own choices. Second, Jemeines has a strong implication of per-
sonal tasks to be performed by each of us in our individuality but invariably carried 
out against the backdrop of a given situation in a modus of being “already-in” (the 
past) the Umwelt we happen to find ourselves in. This ontological aspect of “to be” (zu 
sein) opens up a vast (and often dreadful in uncertainty) vista of possibilities awaiting 
us. Dasein standing in the open, never knowing what is going to crop up, uncertain 
as to the future awaiting us, never knowing what others will do (a very important 
existential Being-with others—Mitdasein), and in what intentions and capacities the 
variable and unpredictable world may appear displaying either threatening or friendly 
aspects. This undeniably makes our being in the world a challenging affair. It seems 
our interests in chosen aspects of reality, our projects, plans and endeavours, our likes 
and dislikes, education, business, all facilities and hurdles demand our engagement, 
taking up the resolute stance characteristic of free beings-in-the world, aware of their 
freedom, responsible, resolute, and conscientious. 
being ever-open and non-static. What I do is somehow in reference to what I have done, do now 
and—more essentially shall do in the future. It is Sorge that best underlines this unprecedented 
temporality.
2 This motif will be obsessively stressed in the atheistic ontologie radicale in L’Être et le Néant in the 
Sartrean version of existentialism—the neutral fact in Heidegger will assume an inflated aspect in 
Sartre, Camus, Merleau-Ponty—leading to the declaration of the world and men as being de trop 
(hence absurd and ontologically excessive).
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But the world, being our only place to realize our projects, the world of things 
we can resort to in order to get something done for our sake, is not such a familiar mi-
lieu. Turning its attention to things either given as mere physical objects (before our 
hands—Vorhanden), utensils (Zeuge) Dasein discovers a fascinating regularity. Zeuge 
refer to one another, and form systems of mutual reference of meanings, for tools are 
by a man and for a man. They appear on Dasein’s horizon to serve us and be handy. 
We are in a way united with them, as by virtue of the constitutive nature of Dasein 
united in Besorgen acts with others. Thus, the worldliness of the world is revealed to 
Dasein (the latter being the point of series of references in the acts of taking care of 
(Besorgen)). This type of knowledge (still better knowing) is not procured, obtained 
through concepts or ideas, i.e. through acts of intellection. I know how to hammer in 
a nail, write a letter, or repair a given utensil and do not need to resort to intellect and 
its “products”: theories and principles. Time and again, we find Heidegger underlin-
ing the importance not of cognitive, theoretical acts of cognizance but of a specific 
unprecedented “practical” modi of approaching and not only thus getting to accustom 
ourselves but to “modify”, transform the world we were thrown into. The existential 
we are describing now is Befindlichkeit, an immersion in and an attachment to the 
milieu, peopled with other Dasein, utensils, relations, projects, choices and accom-
plishments and/or failures. Befindlichkeit is a distinct mark of our existential situa-
tion playing a not-to-be underrated role in the Heideggerian hermeneutics. It is best 
revealed—says Heidegger—in special kinds of awareness, experiences, and insights. 
These are moods (Stimmungen) revealing the real structure of the world. It stands to 
reason that Heidegger parts company with traditional “metaphysical,” “epistemologi-
cal,” “theological” ways of dealing with the transcendent reality. As Dasein is a unique 
part and parcel of the world it has been situated into, as this world is the only human 
space for realization of our possibilities (zu Sein) including the constitution of our 
authentic (eigentlich), unique, “essence” being at one with our existence. Let us recall 
once again—and this point is vital in the light of our analysis that what Heidegger 
regards as his existential hermeneutics—that the analytic of Dasein is based on the 
fundamental assumption that Dasein’s essence is identified, is “at one with” its exist-
ence. The univocally pronounced formula zu sein “imposes” (although it is our free, 
unhampered choice) a certain way of existing in the world we were thrown into. Still 
better, it bears strong implication to transcend itself, to be what we are in the ecstatic 
structure of our temporality: to resolutely face our past (not treated, however, as a 
rigid limitation) in view of future projects—actually one: to be oneself in the world 
now and the world to come. But the world treated by Dasein as its natural, familiar 
(heimlich), cosy environment—the place where our projects are realized, our essence 
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constituted, tools used, and relations activated can display another, quite unfamiliar, 
aspect, that of unheimlich. This psychoanalytic Freudian category irrespective of the 
proved or not influence on Heidegger was in the cultural, literary, and philosophical 
air at the time the philosopher was working on his opus magnum. Moods—as has al-
ready been said—reveal the genuine structure of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, which 
Heidegger claims is among other things related not only to the hic and nunc dimen-
sion of our existence, but its temporality: its three-fold—as it were—alloy of the past 
and the present couched in the now and hence colouring the future — the sphere of 
Dasein’s possibilities (Blackham, 1965, 93). 
The hermeneutical circle of explication—Heidegger has proposed—works like 
a rotating mechanism set in slow but constant circular movement. The latter displays 
existentials and categories operating at one time and disappearing after they have dis-
played their possible application insofar as obtaining the sense and meaning of our 
condition is concerned. In-der-Welt-Sein seems to be a central point of reference—
having been endowed with a critical role in this process. Through this existential all 
other existentials are shown in the light of us approaching Being qua Being, which 
fulfils the sense of our authentic existence. 
One can be fully justified in stating that Heidegger presented two models, two 
structures of our being-in-the-world. For the sake of clarity, let us call them a positive 
model and a negative one.
Befindlichkeit may be treated as multifaceted experience. It is our passage to 
accessibility to the worldhood of the world: things—tools, relations, references—but 
other Dasein as well. Not only are we supposed to be our own centre of possibilities, 
decisions, choices, and projects, but others are to be treated in a similar way. Moreo-
ver, being in the world, each Dasein enters into a special relation with others, thus be-
coming aware of the imperative of standing in-the-open-to-the-world. But the world 
revealed in the existential Befindlichkeit does not hide anything from our awareness. 
The task to be is—so to speak—perfectly matched with identical tasks others are due 
to perform. United we may stand in the mutual stance of Jemeinigkeit. If only …
Now it is high time we introduced this negative aspect, still better aspects of our 
condition revealed by our possibilities. It appears to be a kind of a reverse process, 
movement on the part of Dasein in the world. Instead of seeking to constitute its 
essence, to “present” it to the surrounding world thus marking off our Jemeines from 
other Daseins, we try to deface or obliterate it. Attunement to the world, a constant 
taking care of Being which absorbs our attention, while obstacles, broken tools, and 
thwarted plans may all evoke a kind of uneasy, discomforting Stimmungen. But there is 
still a far more important source of a negative, depressive mood. In its acute awareness 
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of a self-imposed task of to be, Dasein at one point has an uneasy glimpse of the inal-
ienable possibility: one’s own death. On considering the latter’s nature, Dasein comes 
to a disturbing conclusion that it is the possibility terminating all possibilities, thus 
becoming the pure impossibility of any possibility (Mróz, 1997, 17). Death is truly my 
own affair—the affair dis-colouring the whole world I deemed to be “my own” cosy, 
homely sphere. Apart from the ultimate possibility of my own death, of my only true 
experience nobody but we can go through. Being may reveal itself as something dis-
concerting. Along with this uneasy awareness there may come a mood opening up the 
other aspect of Being: a threatening burden, a structure I cannot assimilate—which 
cannot serve me as a neutral if not friendly milieu for my projects. Thus the celebrat-
ed Heideggerian quartet takes the stage: Fear, Anxiety, Nothingness, and Boredom. 
Moods disclose uncanny (unheimlich) reality, of which I feel fear when something 
unbearable or frightening but concrete stands in my way. In his widely known (al-
though not of Heideggerian origin) distinction between fear and anxiety (Angst), the 
latter is caused literally by nothing. Das Nicht is not, however, a mere opposition to the 
plenum of beings. It constitutes the ontologically closely knit whole—capable of dis-
closing (the Altheia of later Heidegger) Being qua Being—its finite temporal nature. 
These four moods initiate—as has already been hinted at—an opposite to the zu Sein 
project, the authentic approach. In other words, in a welter of possibilities, inherent in 
the essence-existence of Dasein—free, responsible, future-oriented situational being-
in-the-world is drastically reduced to only one, albeit conflicting, pair: the authentic 
versus the inauthentic. Das Man (as a distinct possibility of Dasein) is associated in 
the fundamental ontology with what is referred to as fall (Verfallen)—what is taken 
up by Dasein as an inauthentic modus of existing in the world. Now we are quite pre-
pared to present this epitome of the flight from resoluteness of being-in-the-world 
Dasein chooses in order to hide from itself its true conditio humana.
In the fourth chapter of Sein und Zeit (intended as a further step to deepen in-
sights into the essence=existence of Dasein in not more than four pages of a very con-
densed and reader unfriendly text), Heidegger presents an impressive example of his 
hermeneutic phenomenology. To adequately expose this subject, according to tenets 
of the Heideggerian existential approach of his onto-ontological analysis and descrip-
tion, the present authors begin this final section of their reconstructive presentation 
with a note on the very language he employs (Małecka, 2018). 
As is generally known, translators of Heideggerian texts find it almost im-
possible to render some of the Heideggerian philosophical terminology into their 
mother tongues, and Sein und Zeit is no exception to this challenging regularity. Das 
Man, shrouded in a kind of cryptical, somewhat murky atmosphere evoking such 
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diverse connotations ranging from thought-provoking associations to poetical im-
ages, serves as a pertinent illustration of the Heideggerian style, one which is always 
closely geared up with his purport: saving Being from oblivion and revealing Being 
qua Being through the agency of Dasein. Like in so many cases, the philosopher trans-
gresses both the grammatical and lexical status quo and the language code of his na-
tive tongue. To our mind it is not mere wordplay or an iconoclastic, purely rebellious 
gesture of defiance, but an act of expression of a philosopher who is deeply convinced 
that he has new, fresh ideas to propound, and resorts to unique methods to make 
these ideas resound in our souls. 
Das Man is an iconic term coined in a somewhat different manner than other 
Heideggerian terms. Although like all other key terms it does reveal a new aspect of 
reality, the philosopher wants to share it with first his students, then with his regular al-
beit not so numerous readers. As should be borne in mind, Heidegger chooses unique 
ways of coining terminology he needs at a given moment. Some essential nouns are 
provided with verbs sounding similar to the native ear, but on closer look are deprived 
of the status of the accepted members of the current code of philosophishe Sprache. 
Examples are legion: das Nichts nichtet, das Welt weltet, etc. In the case of das Man we 
are dealing with the unusual combination of the neutral article das with a word it does 
not collocate with. In such an astounding manner of expression Heidegger intends to 
introduce his seminal analysis of “closing-in” existential. His analysis will concentrate 
on the very existentiality of Dasein’s being in the world in its negative reverse aspect, 
as it were. For example, the construction of the phrase Man spricht clearly displays 
Heidegger’s intentions, with Man used in standard German to describe general but 
mostly trivial everyday ‘performances,’ like Man raucht—“one smokes cigarettes,” or 
“they smoke cigarettes.” Close reading of the four pages on this existential is designed 
to enlighten the area of the Heideggerian interest in Alltäglichkeit (Everydayness)—the 
time and milieu of Dasein’s existence and “doings” which the philosopher approach-
es in the perspective of both man and his/her most fundamental project. The latter 
implies that my being-in-the-world must—due to my choices, projects, application 
of tools (Zeuge), in a word: owing to the structure of Sorge (care)–involve being with 
others.
Heidegger uses two cognate terms which are operational insofar as the so-called 
Mitwelt, the world shared with others, the domain of our actual existence, is con-
cerned. The examples he produces are simple, imbued with a feeling of familiarity if 
not banality. Dasein encounters—we find Heidegger announcing his insights into the 
matter of the social world—others (beings like us) in a series of implications, refer-
ences, and mutual relations. Thus one is fully justified in regarding the existence of 
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others not as a purely accidental affair, nor a mere neutral problem to be tackled in 
philosophical or sociological reflection but as an existential shibboleth, constitutive 
of my being-in-the-world. There is no need to recall once again the celebrated Heide-
ggerian examples of a pen, a letter to be written by a particular Dasein—all “parties” 
implying wider and longer structures. What is at stake now (to wit the fourth chapter 
and its last section) is the question raised by the philosopher: What do we imply while 
pointing to a barber and their client, or a shopkeeper in their grocery store providing 
their customers with basic food products to meet their needs and wants. Taking care 
of (Sorgen) and using/taking advantage of e.g. tools and various materials for realizing 
our diverse projects refer to Dasein in-the-world-with-others. That is quite obvious, 
but what is apparently simple and taken for granted must nevertheless be scrutinized 
in the light of fundamental ontology and its unique hermeneutics of Dasein—Heideg-
ger seems to be saying. No wonder that the question of the carrier of all those actions, 
engagements and “participations” crops up and begs an answer. As may be easily sur-
mised in his disparaging stance towards both traditional metaphysics and the posi-
tivistic paradigm (including many regional ontologies to use the Heideggerian term), 
the author of Sein und Zeit in light of his hermeneutics rejects the Cartesian and parts 
company with the Husserlian proposals concerning the allegedly certain basis for all 
philosophical thinking that is the Ego (its transcendental version included). 
It stands to reason that Ego, consciousness or subject or subjectivity, spiritual 
substance, soul, mind—regarded for ages as the only acceptable solution by many tra-
ditions and schools of thought—cannot and must not be regarded as an adequate con-
stituent of Selbst or Ichkeit, my own existence. Dasein is in the domain of existentiality, 
which means that Ego would be an entirely unreliable element in the hermeneutical 
procedures of coming closer to embracing the meaning of Being qua Being through 
this ontic-ontological privilege of unique understanding which Dasein is endowed 
with. The philosopher delegates Dasein—endowed with this unique onto-ontological 
privilege—to understand its own self, hence Being as such. But Dasein is invariably 
a playground of its own possibilities—which can make or break its (our) authentic 
being. In other terms Dasein may choose and enter the path leading to the process of 
Verfallen, a fall, but also inversely the path of Sorge, Angst (Anxiety), Befindlichkeit, 
and first of all this unique possibility entailed in Sein zum Tode: our onto-ontological 
finality, with all that follows being true markers of the authentic existence in the world. 
All these called here existential properties—for lack of a better term—of Dasein 
come to constitute what Heidegger refers to as a series of conditions (provided they 
are resolutely and bravely met) making Dasein’s existence eigentlich (authentic). But 
possibilities are of a twofold nature. There occurs simultaneously the other side of the 
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existential coin: a retreat, even an attempt at escaping one’s being which is to be (zu 
Sein) my own existence, not that of the other.
What follows in the last section of the fourth chapter is a cascade of astounding 
ideas. Being authentic is for Heidegger isomorphic with one’s being, “my own” being. At 
a certain point in human time and space, however, for unspecified reasons there may 
occur a “dialectical” move of negation of the authentic modus of existence. Still better, it 
is Dasein itself that can enter into the negative (identified with the inauthentic) mode of 
being in the world. Heidegger categorically states that while Dasein wants to distinguish 
itself, mark itself off from others, this distancing from beings I am with in the world 
(Mitwelt) is at the same time a turning towards them. Now the problem raised by the 
question of who the subject of this social interaction is finds at least a partial explana-
tion (Heidegger, 1962,151). For the philosopher, being with others (Mitsein) is treated 
as an existential closely related to being-in-the-world. The point of great significance 
is the Mitsein, which entails our determination or decision to overcome the difference 
between “me” and “them”. It may unfortunately turn out to be my disastrous undoing. 
The difference may consist in our “inferiority,” a lack of certain qualities/values/assets 
“they” have got but I have not. So (we feel tempted to use this hackneyed psychological 
form) our motivation may express an endeavour to catch up with them. Likewise, when 
we have the upper-hand over the other we share the world with (Mitdasein) we want 
to retain this status, but in such a way as not to make it felt by others (Heidegger, 1962, 
155). All in all, there is a strong resolution to obliterate anything that would make me 
“stand out,” to be different from them. To put it differently, this modus of being-in-the-
world, classed as uneigentlich (inauthentic) is based on a paradox, although Heidegger 
does not use this term. The more I want to distance from the crowd the more quickly I 
become one of them. This is the Heideggerian example of everyday, personal life caught 
by its would be consequences, still better in the process of what he calls Verfallen. 
Any rational narration, metaphysical, psychological, or sociological, referring to 
for example the universal nature of humanity, a drive to be one in order to feel safe, or 
G. H. Mead’s concept of the generalized other, would not meet with Heidegger’s approv-
al. The state of “fall” (Verfallen) is an inalienable component of being of Dasein, like the 
very modus of being-with-others within the structure of a shared world. But annihila-
tion of the difference first triggered by keeping oneself at a proper distance from other 
people leads us straight into a state of subservience. What does it mean? Why does 
it take place? For one thing this impersonal subject, anonymous and invisible, imper-
ceptible in its vicious, treacherous power, is our inherent possibility. That is why, let us 
recall, Heidegger does not show either approval or disapproval, or condescension or 
contempt, while analysing this Durchschnittlichkeit phenomenon. In other words, this 
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commonest (Heidegger, 1962, 156), equated with giving up a conscious choice of indi-
viduality is welcome by all of those who seek a kind of refuge, a safe haven escaping from 
the world disclosed by moods—the world of Anxiety (which imperceptibly permeates 
our existence inducing a “tingle” of nothingness, still more important facing the most 
individual of all possibilities: my own death eliminating all possibilities. This hasty but 
insincere “yes,” I am mortal but look it is not yet, not now, not here, is a stance character-
istic of inauthenticity. Pertaining to the commonest brings a kind of solace, soothes all 
incertitudes, alleviates pains, keeps nothingness away from das Man but not from us as 
individual Dasein. Moreover, when conforming to the call of das Man we readily accept 
all established usages, judgements and—of the utmost importance—we carefully but 
uncritically listen to what Heidegger calls the public opinion. Our resignation from one’s 
being jemeines, being one’s own is an indelible sign of accepting the “harsh” but imper-
ceptible dictatorship of this ubiquitous dictator having such a great impact on our life. 
In the impressive, memorable fragment of the concluding section of the Hei-
deggerian insights we read about the “evaporating” of each individual being of us, 
becoming everyone but not anyone at the same time, of a dissolution of all diversity, 
of an eventual perdition of an individual involvement in the process of taking care of 
what we really think valuable and worth preserving. Instead, one follows the heavily 
trodden path thousands have entered on before us. And thousands will in future. It is 
of a particular interest to quote Heidegger on the deleterious influence das Man exerts 
on our views of art, literature, and poetry (Heidegger, 1962, 158–159). These domains 
of Dasein, demanding an inalienable personal attitude, become victims of this terrible 
levelling out. We give up (although we would vehemently deny it) our own views and 
ideas in unopen confrontation with others. Likewise we change our way of commu-
nication: one’s individualized language (Sprache) transforms itself into “meaningless” 
prattle to locate itself in everyone’s small talk. 
Although the fourth chapter of Sein und Zeit does not undertake the problem of 
authenticity versus inauthenticity by using the very terms eigentlich and uneigentlich 
covering—as it were all negative aspects of Verfallen—Desein’s distinct, inherent pos-
sibility of to be, any presentation of this critical problem without reference to a wider 
Heideggerian context would lack clarity and coherence. Moreover, this problem did to 
a great extent influence many theories and artistic expression: poetry, literature, and 
visual arts of the late 1920s and 1930s which owed a great deal to the Heideggerian 
handling of the human being’s true identity3. It is not a question which can be reduced 
3 The writers like Ernst Jünger, Alfred Döblin, Alfred Kubin, Witkacy, and T. S. Eliot and D. H. Law-
rence in England all take up the subject of depersonalized masses in modern industrial societies.
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to our compliance with certain established thus generally approved of (if not imposed 
upon us) opinions, ideas, and current concepts (Heidegger uses the term “fashionable” 
in his subsequent texts), aesthetic tastes or preferences of the day. Once we decide—in 
an act of freedom—to overcome the difference between “me” and “them” (the latter 
taking the form of undefinable vague power of das Man), we choose the other side of 
the existence in the world and immediately lose our unique way to become ourselves. 
It is—says Heidegger—a long, arduous process of establishing our true Ichkeit—not, 
however, to be treated as a subjective, spiritual, or cognitive faculty.
Like in the case of all other existentials, Heidegger directs our attention to a prom-
inence of the being-in-the-world which is the true basis of the analytics of Dasein. As 
our essence lies in existence, such requirements (with no ethical or moral undertones) 
as resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) and the voice of conscience (Gewissen) are wake-up 
calls directed to us to constitute being as our being, hence Being as such. It should be 
borne in mind that what really counts for the philosopher is the hermeneutically ex-
posed resoluteness with which we must face and grapple with what stands in our way 
to achieve and retain this zu Sein—the process of procedural making of ourselves, but 
not escaping from it. The voice of conscience is a constant reminder of the task to be 
accomplished. When the question of who the object and subject of these endeavours is 
was raised, no concrete personal agent was referred to. Similarly, when we want to trace 
the sources we invariably see nothing (literally and metaphysically) behind it. In other 
words, we see our freedom, our loneliness and being on our own, but within the lim-
its of the world, e.g. within its structures of Bewandtnis Struktur of an oft-complicated 
network of interdependencies. What is more, all these opening-up moods—Stimmun-
gen—the moods providing us with priceless knowledge about the world and others—its 
“friendliness,” their “hostility,” and “aloofness,” the inaccessibility of many phenomena 
may simply scare us. If we add to this somewhat grim picture of our reality the condition 
of our insurmountable finality, the possibility terminating all possibilities thus breeding 
Anxiety, exerting pressure to be ourselves in the face of this unique moment we may 
turn to the other side of our existence-essence, and make its own travesty.
In the face of the lack of universal systems of values, rules, and norms (we are 
supposed to make them valid in our choices throughout human history), we may ex-
perience this ontological strangeness, a kind of alienation, a mood (unheimlich—un-
canniness). At some point in our life (although Heidegger does not specify an exact 
moment) we may turn our attention to the imperceptible but all pervasive presence of 
Das Man—the sphere of the commonest—we may tend to seek comforting refuge there, 
a kind of solace, an alibi as it were. The assimilation of the way one talks, one thinks and 
perceives the world, one reads most popular daily newspapers, one dresses in certain 
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garments, but more importantly the way one is supposed to regard this unique experi-
ence of one’s death and ontological nothingness appears to be an existential solution to 
the problem of being in the world and being with others. Our human condition seems 
to have gained the solidarity and a kind of assurance of the “massive existence”—due to 
familiarity, the psychic comfort, the state of balance having gained ever-ready approval 
flowing from the rest of “them” (Caputo, 1984). But Heidegger—although not employ-
ing any moral stance, not harking back to established ethical systems or theological 
solutions—takes up the existential point of view of yet another distinct possibility of Da-
sein inherent in our existence. Besides being-in-the-world entailing being with others, 
Dasein is being-in-common. That is an alluring possibility on the horizon of the human 
being: raising the fundamental question whether one can lead an authentic existence or 
not. Heidegger maintains that, unlike categories, existentials are not to be removed from 
our condition: zu Sein, authenticity, and das Man are—so to speak—at our disposal. As 
we are part and parcel of this risky but valuable essential Mitdasein—we can perform 
the negative constitution and take on the identity which will bear the commonest traits 
and be like “them,” or we can at least try to lessen the impact of das Man and modify it 
(humanize it in the Heideggerian sense). And that would make all the difference Hei-
degger would have consented to.
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